P. S. Prasanth
The 1984 Lok Sabha elections was the
last parliamentary election to throw up an outright majority for one party with
a clear choice of a leader to become the Prime Minister. The country
experimented with various coalition governments at the Centre for the next 25
years. Now, in 2014, in the 16th Lok Sabha elections, for the first
time in the history of independent India
Now, what are the major observations
that can be made on this decisive outcome of 2014? In the following three sections, some
significant points brought out by expert-studies on the 2014 national elections
are compiled. This article is a
consolidation of five analytical essays that appeared in the Economic & Political Weekly on the
recently held parliamentary elections; the indebtedness to the authors (Suhas
Palshikar, Pradeep Chhibber, Rahul Verma, E. Sridharan ,
K.C. Suri and K.K. Kailash) of those scholarly articles is deeply
acknowledged. This write-up is organised
in the following manner: in the first section, the decline of the Congress
Party is examined; the second one is a light discussion on the rightward drift
of the growing Indian middle classes; the third section discusses the rise of
the BJP where the so-called ‘Modi-wave’ too is briefly glanced at. Finally, it is a round-up of a conclusion.
1.
Decline of Indian National Congress
“What happened to the Congress Party in 2014 has all the characteristics
of an electoral disaster rather than a defeat” [1]. In terms of both seats and votes, the recent
parliamentary elections saw the Congress dip to the lowest level ever in its
electoral history. With just around 19%
of the votes and 8% (44) of the seats the grand old party recorded its worst
ever defeat. The hegemony of the
Congress over the polity had indeed started to decline since the party’s defeat
in the 1977 elections in spite of the strong leadership at that time under Smt.
Indira Gandhi. Since then the Congress
had always been on slippery ground; in 1984 and 1991, the party made gains in
the wake of two assassinations. In 2004,
UPA-I came to power under the stewardship of the Congress but its performance
was not impressive in terms of both votes and seats. A semblance of recovery took place between
2004 and 2009 and UPA-II came to power in 2009. However, since 2009, the party
began to stagnate and lost momentum completely.
Just before the general elections of 2014, the credibility of the party
and its leadership had reached its nadir.
Retrospectively, the ephemeral victory in 2004 and the slight recovery
in 2009 can be viewed only as temporary features [1]. In May 2014, the Congress entered the
electoral fray with a disadvantage.
Broadly speaking, two political factors ensured that the party would
decline in this election. One was the
poor performance of the UPA-II and the Congress-led state governments as
perceived by the people and the other was the issue of leadership or the lack
of it as compared to the great show of the same put on display by its main
political opponent, the BJP.
As per the National Election Study (NES 2014), in January 2014, 34% of
the respondents reported “full dissatisfaction” with the performance of the UPA
and a meagre 8% reported “full satisfaction” with the government’s performance
[1]. The dent in the image of the UPA-II
created by the various scams was huge.
The coal scam, the 2G spectrum scam, the Commonwealth scam, the Adarsh
Housing scam, Robert Vadrs’s scam and several other scandals generated a very
negative image for the government in the minds and hearts of the people. The anti-corruption agitations led by Anna and
Baba helped in reinforcing the image of the government as a corrupt one, from
the top to the bottom, across all sections of people. The contributions of the AAP in the
consolidation of this negative image are not too insignificant. Another reason that blackened its image
particularly among the poor and the backward sections of the people was its
heavy dependence on politics of subsidies and welfare-ism – it did not play out
the way the party intended. The NES 2014
collected information on four major schemes implemented by the UPA government,
namely, those related to housing, rural employment, medical facilities and
pensions (for aged widows and disabled).
The data indicated that only one in every five respondents benefitted
from any of these schemes [2]. This
indicates that the inability of the state to actually deliver on its promises
had a particularly large impact on the very group that the Congress-led UPA was
trying to keep by its side – the poor and the marginalised. The dissatisfaction levels were high and the
opponents of the Congress could easily capitalise on this sentiment.
In addition to the lacklustre performance of its national government,
the image of the congress got eroded further due to the disappointing
performance of its state governments too.
At the state level, the Congress’s governance record could not compare
well with its main rival. In the run-up
to the 2014 elections, the perception of the central government in the eyes of
the public was very negative and the assessment of the Congress’s state
governments was also almost invariably negative. In states where the Congress was the ruling
party at the time of Lok Sabha elections, its performance was rather
disastrous. It was routed in Andhra
Pradesh, Maharashtra and Haryana. It was badly defeated in Assam
The factor of leadership also turned out to be a crucial one. In 2004, the decision of Smt. Sonia Gandhi
not to claim the office of Prime Minister earned her goodwill. However, Rahul Gandhi’s decision before the
elections, not to be designated as party’s candidate for the post of Prime
Minister did not similarly help the party.
That decision came rather too late and by then the BJP had already
converted the election into a plebiscite on leadership [1]. Since the demise of Indira Gandhi, Congress
Party has been struggling to overcome the leadership void and Rahul Gandhi who
did not have the support of the majority in the Congress for his efforts to
rejuvenate the party through its reorganisation was no match for the
rejuvenated BJP under Narendra Modi. In
the contest between Modi and Gandhi, the Congress was at a huge disadvantage to
the BJP.
Perhaps even deeper structural issues and processes are at the root of
the decline of the Congress Party over the past three decades and the 2014
debacle may be just a continuation of that pattern from which it might find it
very hard to recover. Nevertheless, the
fact remains that in the 16th Lok Sabha elections the Congress faced
an unprecedented decline and a comprehensive defeat. A lethal cocktail of negative factors
resulted in the congress Party proving unable to pick up votes from across
different social sections. In the entire
Hindi belt, the Congress won only eight seats; this is partly because of the
Congress’s historical inability to re-establish in the Hindi speaking region. In direct confrontation with the BJP, the
Congress faced dismally and could win barely 5% of the seats. In terms of caste, the Congress seems to have
lost all its base among upper, intermediate and OBC castes. This left the party extremely vulnerable
since it had to rely only on SC, ST and minority votes and it was not easy to
win seats with such a limited pool of voters.
Even among the SC and ST constituencies, of the 84 seats reserved for
SCs, Congress managed to win only 7 and out of the 47 seats reserved for STs,
the party won just 5 seats. The only
groups among which the Congress did not lose votes were the adivasis, Muslims
and Christians. This practically gives
the party the shape of a party of minorities [1].
In this sense, the elections of 2014 have left the Congress Party without
any social constituency of its own. At
the same time, the defeat had meant that voters from practically every social
section have turned away from the party and thus, the strength of the party has
become weak across all social sections.
Polling only fewer than 20% of the votes is bad enough; but, not polling
more among any social group is really the worst part of Congress’s failure in
2014. This failure indicates the larger
decimation of the party than the overall vote share indicates [1].
2.
Growth of the middle class and the
drift to the Right
According to some estimates, the size of India India
There were more voters with a rightward leaning attitude on economic
issues in 2014 than in past years. The
reason for this shift is obvious – a mere falling in line with the hegemony of
the capitalist ideology at the global level in the absence of any strong
leftward undercurrents across the country.
A broad comparative study on Western democracies by Iversen and Soskice
(2006) makes the following observation on the middle class: “The middle class,
which tends to decide who governs, has an incentive to ally with the poor to
exploit the rich, but also has an incentive to support the rich to avoid being
exploited by the poor. In a majoritarian
two-party system, the latter motive dominates because the middle class cannot
be sure that the poor will not set policies in a centre-left leadership
party.” The 2014 elections witnessed the
aligning of the middle classes with the pro-business policies of the BJP. This is not to imply that the Congress was
ever anti-business. Nevertheless, the
economic conservatives (those people who hold that in matters of economy and
business, market forces and profit motives should have unbridled sway)
exhibited a marked preference for the BJP, the unabashedly unapologetic
rightist of the two. Hence, the 2014
elections saw a bold articulation of the liberalisation policy in the name of
development by the BJP; the party had
already travelled a long distance from its own ambiguous slogan of ‘swadeshi’
which it anyway had virtually abandoned when it was in power between 1998 and
2004. A clear pro-business line of the
BJP appealed to a large section of voters who saw it as an alternative to the
welfare policies coupled with crony capitalism and mal-governance that India
Why did the upper and upper-middle classes vote for the BJP
disproportionally in 2014? After all,
this did not happen in 2009. A
significant difference between 2009 and 2014 was upper- and upper-middle-class
turnout, both in terms of the higher proportions of the population and in the
proportion of votes cast. The total votes
constituted by these two classes increased from 26% (2009) to 47% (2014) and in
terms of the overall turnout, the increase was from 58% to 68%. The turnout of the poor at 60% was
significantly less than the 68% turnout by the two richer classes [3]. It is noteworthy that 40% of the first-time
voters in the middle-class was pro-BJP and among the under-35 age groups (generation
that grew up in the liberalisation era) in upper and upper-middle classes were
disproportionately pro-BJP [3].
Simple economic dissatisfaction with the ruling government does not
explain the pro-BJP swing. A distinct
rightward shift in attitude is indicated by the responses to a question on
whether the government should spend more on infrastructure then on subsidising
the poor. Majority of the upper and upper-middle
classes are in favour of the government spending on infrastructure rather than
on subsidising the poor. The overriding
sentiment among those in the upper-middle class and among those above them is
that subsidies and state regulations are economically harmful. BJP achieved electoral success in 2014
because it managed to rally both social conservatives (in the Indian context,
social conservatives are those who say that the government should not make
special provisions to accommodate minorities and that reservations based on
caste and religion divide India) and those who favour a reduced role for the
state in the economy, the economic conservatives.
All through the second term of the UPA, the Congress Party kept
oscillating between a pro-poor position and neo-liberal stance in matters of
state policy. This oscillation meant
that confusing signals were sent to different social constituencies and the
middle and upper classes were apprehensive of the Congress going back to Socialism. On the other hand, the signals that emanated
from the rival camp were unambiguous and helped in heightening the aspirations
of these classes. Shri. Modi’s image as
a market friendly, pro-business leader appealed hugely to these sections. During the election campaign, the BJP projected
Gujarat ’s economic growth in a huge way and
Modi played up the idea that he was responsible for the same. Its development model based on rapid
industrialisation and building infrastructure by allowing free market and free
run to private capital and businesses might have generated considerable support
among the middle and upper classes cutting across castes and communities. Along with this, with promises of “no
tokenism” and “no special privileges” they managed to draw those who would like
the state to minimise its role in the economy by both reducing subsidies and
business regulations.
As far back as 1999, in the aftermath of the BJP’s rise since 1989 and
against the backdrop of its emergence as the single largest party in 1996, 1998
and 1999, several political observers put forward the concept of a “new social
bloc” – a loose coming together of groups, united by relative economic and
social privilege that were tending towards the BJP – urban rich, middle
classes, upper castes and rising landed peasant castes [3]. At 38% and 32%, the upper and upper-middle
class preference for the BJP was more marked as compared to that of lower-middle
and poor classes at 31% and 24% respectively.
But, why would 24% of the poor voters vote for the party that represent
the interests of the wealthy? The
poor-voters paradox, as it is called, is probably explained by the observation
that many amongst the poor, who traditionally supported the Congress, were
swayed this time to the right by the popular perception of Modi as a better
administrator. In addition, Modi did
exploit his OBC status and his tea-vendor tag to the hilt to woo the OBCs,
lower-middle class and the poor from the plank of growth and empowerment. In Gujarat
alone, where the poor had better experiences of Modi’s pro-rich policies, the
Congress was able to surpass the BJP by 8% points among the poor.
In May 2014, the rightist forces benefitted immensely from the growth of
the neo-middle class. The ranks of this
class which emerged and grew up in the post-liberalisation era were neither
liberal nor progressive. Rooted in
traditions and conventions, bereft of any progressive ideological guidance and
enjoying the early fruits of liberalisation, the neo-middle class were totally
conservative in their outlook, both socially and economically – they were
rightist in every sense of the term.
Hence, it turns out to be little surprise that the BJP managed to
harvest more votes from this class of voters as compared to what the Congress
could garner; Congress sowed and BJP reaped.
Overall, the neo-liberal stance of the RSS-backed BJP on various issues
appealed better to the upper, upper-middle, lower-middle and the neo-middle
classes. For the Congress, its socialist
moorings proved to be a handicap.
3.
Tactical and strategic rise of BJP
The BJP polled 31% of the votes and won 52% seats in the recent Lok
Sabha election. This was indeed a great
leap for the party that had receded to barely 19% votes in 2009. While a changeover of 12% of the votes is in
itself a measure of the social ground the party managed to cover since 2009,
the key to its success lies elsewhere – the tactical and strategic steps the
party adopted over several years. On the
surface it might appear that the BJP benefitted from the dissatisfaction with
the UPA and Congress’s state governments; the higher level of satisfaction with
BJP’s state governments; and, its strategic choice of Modi as its leader. Thus, circumstances may appear to have
favoured the BJP in 2014; however, larger processes were at work behind the
scenes which helped the BJP project itself as the only credible alternative
before the people at the time of the parliamentary elections.
3.1. BJP’s “social engineering” and
“Mandalisation”
The BJP has been a major player in the northern and the western regions
of India
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the BJP sought to rise to prominence
by forging political and electoral support on the basis of the hindutva
ideology by taking up the issues of Ram temple in Ayodhya, uniform civil code
and the issue of special status for Kashmir . At the same time, the party faced the dilemma
of balancing its older upper-caste character during the Mandal controversy and
its efforts to forge a larger Hindu unity for the Ayodhya agitation [4]. In response to these developments, both for
purposes of broadening the catchment area for its hindutva ideology and for
responding to democratic compulsions, the BJP began to transform itself. The
party realised that it has to become responsive to the leadership ambitions of
the intermediate castes, the backwards and the dalits and accommodate them in
leadership positions. Kalyan Singh, the
then leader of the legislature party in UP assembly, was made the face of the
Ram Janmabhoomi movement. The OBC leaders such as Uma Bharati and Vinay Katiyar
were brought to the forefront. The social engineering adopted by the BJP saw
the party increase its tally from eight to 52 in UP in the 1991 Lok Sabha
elections. The party won 51 seats in
1996, and 57 in 1998, more than one-fourth of all the seats it won in the
country [4]. In the 1996 Lok Sabha
elections the BJP had emerged as the single largest party pushing the Congress
to a second place for the first time.
During the past two decades leaders from middle and backward castes
became the face of the party at the national and state levels. Venakiah Naidu and Bangaru Laxman, both
belonging to backward castes from Andhra Pradesh, became party presidents. At
the state level, the party projected OBC leaders such as Uma Bharati who became
the chief minister of Madhya Pradesh followed by Shivraj Singh Chouhan; Sushil
Kumar Modi in Bihar; and Gopinath Munde in Maharashtra [4]. The 2014 election saw a concerted effort on
the part of the BJP to expand its electoral support among the OBCs and the
dalits with a determination to stage a comeback. With persistent goading by the RSS, the BJP
managed to bring back to its fold almost all the backward caste leaders who had
left the party due to internal differences; the re-unions happened in time for
the party to present a united front before the public during the
elections. This was topped-off by the
rise of Modi – with the active support of the RSS – in the party on the eve of
elections to become its chief campaigner and the projected prime-ministerial
candidate. Shri. Narendra Modi had all
the characteristics of a plebeian rising to the high level of becoming the
chief minister of an important state. He
made optimum use of his humble social origins. As the electoral campaign
progressed, Modi went on referring to his backward caste background very
explicitly [4].
As the election campaign peaked, Modi became very strident in his
references to political rights of the backward castes. He declared that the BJP
was no longer an upper-caste party.
Speaking at a rally at Muzaffarpur, Bihar
in March 2014, Shri. Narendra Modi emphasised his own lower-caste origins and
humble beginnings. In Kerala,
inaugurating the centenary meet organised by the ‘Kerala Pulayar Mahasabha’ in
Kochi, alluding to reformers like Narayana Guru and Ayyankali, Modi studiedly
mentioned that the saints and social reformers in the past century had belonged
to either the dalit or backward sections of the society and declared that the
next decade will belong to the dalits and the backwards [4]. As a result, the surge of BJP was evident in
Kerala too, but ironically, it seems to have affected the left parties more
than it has affected the Congress.
As the 2014 elections approached, Congress had already failed to inspire
confidence among the OBCs. The OBC
parties such as Samajwadi Party, Rashtriya Janata Dal and even Janata Dal
(United) that held the promise of representing the democratic upsurge and
radically restructuring the society had reached a dead-end in their OBC
politics due to the perception that they were interested only in perpetuating the
political dominion of certain OBC groups around one leader or a certain family. In this context, the BJP was not only present
at the right juncture, but it had skilfully positioned itself as a reliable
platform for all Hindus, particularly the backward Hindus who saw an
opportunity in BJP’s stance on social justice as well as development. Thus,
BJP’s victory this time was a result of a huge shift of voters – cutting across
caste, class, regional, gender lines and age groups. The shift was more
pronounced among the backward-caste voters, especially the OBCs. About
one-third of the OBCs voted for the BJP, and they constituted nearly 40% of all
the votes the BJP got in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. In addition to the upper castes and OBCs, the
BJP received considerable support from the scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes too [4].
The “Mandalisation” of the BJP did not lead to an erosion of support for
the party among the upper-caste voters.
Probably, the upper-caste voters and the OBC voters have learned that
they both can prefer the party at the same time without jeopardising each
other’s interests and compromising their positions. For instance, in Bihar two-thirds of the upper-caste voters voted for the
BJP, while in UP the proportion went up to three-fourth. While the BJP successfully attracted the
OBCs, its support among upper castes did not dwindle, if anything, it only
consolidated.
3.2. BJP and the regional parties in 2014
Of the 86 registered parties which contested Lok Sabha elections since1989,
64 continue to exist in 2014. While some
dropped off, others have merged with other parties. Regional parties have been coalition partners
of national governments since 1996. In
the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, while parties like the Shiv Sena (SHS), All India
Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), All Indian Trinamool Congress (AITC)
and Biju Janata Dal (BJD) among others prospered, the stock of the Asom Gana
Parishad (AGP), Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), Samajwadi Party (SP) and the
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) diminished [5]. What explains this variation in
electoral success especially since all of them are fairly long-standing parties
with solid support bases in their respective states? It appears that the strategic choices
exercised by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) made a difference as to who
slipped and who remained relevant. The
approach of the BJP towards the regional parties in the run-up to the elections
in May 2014 depended on whether a given regional party was regionalist in its
agenda or whether it was just regionally-located. In the 2014 elections, the regionally-located
parties fared poorly compared to the regionalist parties [5]; before discussing
any further, a distinction needs to be drawn between regionally-located and
regionalist parties that are together conveniently referred to as regional
parties.
While both are regional parties in the sense that they have
territorially limited arenas of operation they are very different in terms of
their programme and agenda. Regionalist parties are tied to particular states
and endeavour to promote the interests of the unit they represent.
Regionally-located parties do not necessarily have a regionalist agenda and may
even aspire to be or assume they are polity-wide parties. Yet, they are
relevant only in a limited territorial zone.
Regionalist parties essentially make three types of claims. One, the so-called national parties are not
addressing the interests of particular states and that they can cater to it
better; two, regional or state pride, honour, culture and so on must be
protected; three, they make demands on the centre to relinquish power on
certain subjects and areas. If regionally-located parties do bring up the issue
of tweaking centre-state relations, it is in more general terms rather than with
respect to any particular state. Regionalist parties on the contrary, invoke
loyalty and emotion to a particular identified territory. While all regional
parties are regional in spatial-location terms, all regional parties do not
necessarily have a regionalist agenda [5].
Compared to other zones, the northern zone has seen a relatively lower
number of regionalist parties. Even within the zone, it is in the peripheral
regions of the zone, where regionalist sentiments have found space. Moreover,
the “centre” has always been associated with the north. The relatively greater
homogeneity of the north in terms of language, history, culture, politics,
social and economic background has also not allowed the idea of being different
to be manufactured. The other zones
geographically distanced from the centre have witnessed a greater number of
regionalist movements. Historically, the
other zones have not only been away from locus of power but are also culturally
and linguistically different from the north.
It has consequently been relatively easier for parties in other zones to
politicise differences and use it as a mobilisation tool [5].
A regionalist agenda which gives importance to a particular state,
region, language, culture and so on is often at odds with the framework of a
polity-wide party. While the latter
emphasises on commonalities and attempts to play the aggregator, the former
stresses on differences. Consequently, competing in a regionalist agenda space
was tricky business for the BJP. A
polity-wide party like the BJP therefore constantly has to juggle with multiple
and often contradictory demands that came up from different states. In the regionalist competition space the BJP
tactically emphasised and blurred issues to suit its agenda. While it did not
out-rightly oppose the regionalist agenda, it did not endorse it either. Most
often it pressed mute on the regionalist dimension so that it did not
contradict its own position. At the same time, it could also shift its
attention to other issues on which it had an advantage and downplay the regionalist
agenda. The party had to maintain unity
of purpose and hence could not embrace or be seen to be going along with a
regionalist agenda. Consequently, even
in an alliance, the party maintained a distance from the regionalist sentiments
of its partner. On the other hand, given the increased competiveness and
uncertainty of electoral verdicts, it could not appear to be critical of
regionalist parties either, especially when it was not in alliance considering
the possibility that it might have to turn to them in a post-election scenario
if it fell short of numbers [5].
In 2009, both the regionalist and the regionally-located parties were
almost evenly placed. However in 2014 while the seat-share of regionalist
parties increased from 105 to 168, regionally-located parties slumped to a mere
46. The strategy of the BJP gave greater
leverage to the regionalist parties as compared to the regionally-located
parties. In the 2014 elections, the BJD,
AIADMK and the AITC were among the most successful regionalist parties. In the regionalist space, the party
effectively disguised its nationalistic bias to appear as one among the other
parties and highlighted relatively “harmless” issues like development,
leadership and governance and kept the door open for post-election alliances
with the dominant players. For instance,
in Odisha and West Bengal , the BJP accused the
ruling parties without directly attacking their leaders of neglecting
development. An alliance did not mean
endorsing the regionalist position; instead, the BJP effectively used the
strategy of blurring particular dimensions on the agenda of the regionalist
party while highlighting the other aspects to gain tactical advantage. This stand helped it both to be on the right
side of its allies as well as to not dilute its own agenda.
Tamil Nadu is the classic state with the political landscape dominated
by regionalist parties. The main competition was between the DMK, one of the
oldest regionalist parties, and the AIADMK. The other smaller regionalist
parties combine with the regionalist agenda, a caste dimension. They basically
represent smaller caste groups who have not found space within the dominant
parties. In this election, the BJP opened a new line by aligning with the
smaller regionalist parties. Its campaign focused on issues close to the
regionalist agenda but which had a wider resonance. These included centre-state
relations and relations with neighbouring countries, two perennial issues in
Tamil Nadu politics. The Tamil parties have not only treated the centre with
suspicion and are vary of any move which appears to reduce state autonomy but have
also wanted to have the final word about India’s relations with Sri Lanka. The BJP in their campaign assuaged
regionalist concerns but at the same time shrewdly blurred the party’s own
strong-centre thesis. The BJP’s position on the centre-state dimension was
crafted in very general terms of adherence to the ‘federal structure’ and the
need to respect it in ‘letter and spirit,’ misuse of the office of governor and
central machinery like the income-tax department, the CBI and so on. On the foreign policy dimension the party simply
expressed concern about Tamil fishermen and wanted the centre to be more
sensitive. While this broad noncommittal position resonated with the
regionalist agenda and ensured that the party did not displease its allies or
lose votes, it did not make any strong commitments which would have contradicted
its own position [5].
In Maharashtra , the main competition
has been between two coalition fronts, the INC-NCP and the BJP-SHS. The SHS’s regionalist agenda has always had a
strong communal-nationalist dimension and has therefore gelled with the BJP’s
own project. Strategically, the BJP has either
acted deaf or been soft in its response to SHS’s almost violent promotion of
its sons-of-the-soil agenda. This position has not only kept its ally in good
humour but has also allowed the BJP to maintain its own nationalistic
credentials. By downplaying issues which were secondary to its own agenda,
muffling issues which put it in a disadvantageous position and by turning the
political focus to its areas of strength, the BJP played a tactical game to
gain space in Maharashtra . So much so that
today it is actually in a position of strength and can actually choose between
the two regionalist parties, NCP and SHS [5].
In fact, in the just concluded assembly elections in Maharashtra ,
the BJP emerged as the single largest party, fighting the election on its own;
the BJP deftly out-manoeuvred the regionalist agenda of SHS and attained an
unassailable position from where it could “tame” the SHS and make its own decisions
regarding government formation.
In Punjab , the SAD-BJP alliance has
been mutually beneficial. The SAD is probably the oldest regionalist party in
the country and had held strong views on the restructuring of centre-state
relations at one point of time. The BJP has consistently been silent on the
religious and political autonomist demands that the SAD has put forward from
time to time. In Modi’s Punjab campaign the
focus was limited to neutral and symbolic regionalist issues. For instance, he
spoke of how the Congress glorified their own family while forgetting local
leaders. Similarly, he acknowledged the
contributions of Punjab in the domains of
agriculture and national security. Emphasising a nationalist dimension which
struck a regionalist chord, he spoke calculatedly of the “veer bhoomi” of Punjab [5]. Similarly
in Andhra Pradesh too the BJP campaign was high on symbolism when it came to negotiating
the regionalist agenda. In his speeches, Modi not only focussed on development
and employment, he referred to the former chief minister and regionalist leader
Shri. N.T. Rama Rao and also highlighted the supposed neglect and insult of
local leaders including, the former Prime Minister Shri. P.V. Narasimha Rao.
In Assam Assam Assam Bangladesh
Regionally-located parties are primarily concentrated in Uttar Pradesh
(UP) and Bihar and they did relatively poorly
compared to the 2009 results. Political
parties have been constantly drawing and redrawing caste and community lines to
find a social combination that holds. Consequently, there has been a periodic
fragmentation of both caste groups and political parties in the two states. In
both states, the BJP while consolidating its own social base has been strategically
targeting the groups left out by the main regionally-located parties, the BSP
and SP in UP and the RJD in Bihar . Its
alliance with the JD(U) and now with the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) and
Rashtriya Lok Samata Party (RLSP) in Bihar
have to been seen in this context. The
party has been successful in presenting itself as vehicle for the non-dominant
lower-caste groups, while holding on its own base among the upper castes. In Bihar and
UP, the BJP has followed the same strategy of targeting the non-dominant lower
castes to widen its own support base. For
instance, previous studies in Bihar have shown
that the lower OBC votes have decisively shifted from the RJD to the BJP-JD(U)
alliance. Its present alliance with the RLSP which has its base amongst a lower
OBC group, was intended to make good the loss of the JD(U) alliance [5]. Additionally, the OBC-politics of the other
main parties of the region had already reached a dead-end, as mentioned in the
previous sub-section. With the BJP projecting
its strongly appealing OBC-face – that of Shri. Narendra Modi, the disgruntled OBCs
in UP and Bihar – oblivious to all other
sensibilities – felt little compunction in joining the BJP-led bandwagon of
growth, development and empowerment. Thus,
now it appears that in 2014, the BJP did get its social alliances right, and at
just the right time.
3.3. The Modi effect
Parties, media and academics were unanimous in labelling the outcome of
the 2014 elections as a victory for Shri. Narendra Modi. The rise of Modi as the central figure,
around whom the BJP’s campaign revolved, made the election something of a
plebiscite on the leader and his policies rather than a choice of candidates in
constituencies. There was considerable
disenchantment with the UPA government over its scams and with the Congress
Party over its leadership weakness; at the same time, there was palpable
attraction for Modi as a leader. The BJP
framed the 2014 elections as a choice between Narendra Modi and Rahul Gandhi.
Its victory was secured by a well-planned presidential style campaign around
Modi himself. Opinion polls conducted by
Lokniti-CSDS captured early evidence of Modi’s increasing popularity. Modi’s
popularity increased in the wake of his appointment as the chief of BJP’s
campaign committee in June 2013. It remained steady, with over one-third of
respondents mentioning his name as their preferred choice for Prime Minister
once he was named the prime-ministerial candidate in September 2013. In fact,
Modi was preferred as Prime Minister by more citizens than those who preferred
Rahul Gandhi, Sonia Gandhi, and Manmohan Singh combined together [2]. The 2014 elections was the first one since
Indira Gandhi’s departure when leadership became an almost decisive
factor. Modi and his supporters surely worked
extra-hard towards achieving this objective. But, it is equally noteworthy that
the electorate was also prepared to seek a leader – even bypassing regional and
caste loyalties.
In 2014, there has been a clear rightward shift on issues related to the
role of state in economy; a sizeable chunk of the voters had emerged as
rightward leaning on economic issues.
The administrative failures of the UPA government in managing the
economy might have played a catalytic role in the emergence of the economic right
as an electoral force. Modi’s campaign
stridently emphasised the “paradigm of development” and “economic
freedom.” It was propagated as if this
election was all about these concepts just as it was all about political
freedom in 1977. This message carried
multiple nuances and was able to attract different economic layers of voters.
Modi’s image as a market friendly, pro-business leader helped the BJP to
attract the economic right. In his
campaign meetings, Modi harped upon the Gujarat
model of development based on rapid industrialisation by providing necessary
incentives to the business houses to setup industries and businesses and
focussing on the development of infrastructure such as roads, ports,
electricity, water, and so on. Modi’s
widely perceived image as a socially conservative, pro-business leader helped
the BJP in pulling towards itself a coalition of social and economic
conservatives. It was Modi and not the
BJP that drew the economic conservatives to the party in 2014. Respondents to
the NES 2014 were asked whether they would have voted for the BJP if Modi had
not been the BJP’s prime-ministerial candidate. The analysis indicated that
social conservatives were more likely than liberals to say that Modi’s
candidature made no difference as to whether they would have voted for the BJP
or not. In contrast, those on the economic right indicated that they would have
voted differently (i.e., not voted for the BJP) if Modi had not been the BJP’s prime-ministerial
candidate. In fact, as many as 23% of
the upper and upper-middle classes said that they would have voted for a
different party other than the one they voted for if Shri. Narendra Modi had
not been the prime-ministerial candidate of the BJP [3].
While only 24% of the poor preferred to vote for the BJP, about 31%
among the lower-middle-class voters voted for the BJP. It was slightly high
among the upper-middle class at 32%, and rather high at 38% among the upper
class. In the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, only 22% of the upper-middle-class had
voted for the BJP. So, the BJP saw an increment of about 10% of vote among the upper-middle-class
voters between 2009 and 2014 [4]. Many
among the poor and the lower-middle classes, who traditionally had supported
the Congress, probably perceived in Modi a better administrator and voted for
him in this parliamentary election.
Modi’s popularity as a good administrator could cut across the social
and political landscape of India Maharashtra are largely due to Modi’s intense campaigns
in these two states.
In conclusion, as it stands, this is
the first time that any political party other than the Congress has come so
close to being pan-Indian in terms of its geographical reach and presence
across almost all states. The BJP has
emerged as a national party, growing beyond the confines of the Hindi
heartland, although its success has been made possible by the large number of
seats it secured in the Hindi-speaking states.
Polling over 40% of the votes in these states is a phenomenal success. The BJP won approximately 44% vote share and
190 seats of the 225 seats in the Hindi-speaking states, i.e., 85% of the total
seats. Along with its allies, it
virtually swept the region by winning 201 seats. In contrast, in the non-Hindi-speaking
states, the BJP won only 22% of the votes and 92 of the 318 seats. However, on the whole, this NDA coalition
managed to perform better than any other NDA coalition could manage in the past
[2]. BJP’s success became possible because
of the slow but sure process of social groups aligning with the BJP. The BJP began with a base among the upper and
intermediate castes; succeeded in winning over sections of the OBC groups in
the 1990s and now has firmly entrenched itself in both upper and OBC
communities. This social base has been additionally augmented by the BJP’s
ability to move beyond the so-called “caste Hindu” groups (savarnas) and
acquire decent support among dalits and adivasis. The transformation of the BJP, along with the
language of development, persuaded many observers to believe that the BJP was
shaping as a clear right-of-centre (but secular?) platform. Whether BJP will
exercise that option and occupy the right-of-centre position without exciting
secular sensibilities or involving claims to cultural majoritarianism is a
crucial question that shall be answered in time.
The tactical stand adopted by the
BJP towards regional parties proved crucial in the elections. In regionalist states, the BJP focused more
on issues like development, good leadership and corruption rather than
positional issues like restructuring centre-state relations and regional pride.
If it spoke on the issue of federal relations, it was in neutral and
non-committal, vague terms of better centre-state relations. At the same time,
in some states it turned regionalist agendas into a nationalist one. In Assam Assam and also
consolidate itself in states like Punjab, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra .
Second, it did not antagonise
regionalist parties, almost as if preparing for a post-election scenario. This differentiated campaign strategy gave
regionalist parties greater space as compared to regionally-located
parties. In the regionalist competition
space, the party campaign was tangential and there was a conscious attempt not
to hurt regionalist sentiments, whereas in non-regionalist states the BJP was
relatively unconstrained. The party aimed to consolidate its own social
coalition while weakening that of the others. The non-regionalist parties may
have done poorly in 2014; however, it is probably not the end of the road. The
BJP will have to work very hard to maintain its newly stitched social
coalitions, if past experiences are anything to go by.
The magnitude of BJP’s victory in
this election presents a serious challenge to the BJP itself as much as to
other political parties. Naturally, the
challenge for the BJP in the near future is to keep its winning coalition together. It would be naive for the BJP’s leadership
not to realise that maintaining the stunning vote-seat conversion ratio that
the party achieved in the 2014 elections and repeating its exemplary
performance in Uttar Pradesh will be difficult in the future. So if it wishes
to maintain its majority, the BJP will need to build a wider and deeper
organisational base and expand its pockets of influence. Moreover, as the
incumbent Congress’s loss in this election is closely tied to non-performance,
massive corruption, and failure to deliver welfare benefits, Modi and the BJP
need to deliver on the promises they both made during the campaign. The party
needs to perform and Modi needs to deliver more than shrill speeches. The election of 2014 marked a moment when the
voters looked forward to a strong leader and chose one when a party presented
them with such an option. Indeed, there
is no doubt that nations require strong and decisive leaders, but extending
this to the point where it transfigures into leader-centrism would never auger
well for democracy. Unfortunately, we
are now witnesses to the unfolding of precisely this rather unhealthy trend at
the national level in the form of the emerging Modi-Shah axis; the extent to
which this trend shall grow in the existing political conditions will be observed
with keen interest.
The ‘Hindu’ coalition on which the
BJP depends for its survival is fraught with tensions. Such a social coalition can survive either
through a constant reference to the “other” in the form of the non-Hindu, by an
invocation of the Hindu essence of the Indian society, or by bringing about a dramatic
economic turnaround. Just as a generous construction of hindutva is based on
inclusion of backward, dalit and adivasi communities, it is also predicated on
an exclusion of the non-Hindu, especially the Muslim. Apart from the sparse support that BJP could
muster among Muslim voters, the fact that it does not have single member in the
Lok Sabha from Muslim community that constitutes about 13% of India
Finally, it can be safely predicted
that the weakening of the Congress as witnessed in May 2014 is likely to be a
long-term trend as evidenced by the results of the recent legislative assembly
election results in Haryana and Maharashtra . It is highly unlikely that the Congress will
recover its lost ground at the national level in the near future. The entire Congress Party machinery has been
going around the Nehru-Gandhi axis for far too long and the axis is now badly
worn-out; a collapse looks very much imminent.
At this historic juncture, the role of the Left parties should be to
rally all the progressive forces to hasten the collapse of the Congress and
thereby occupy the political space thus left open in the wake of Congress’s
collapse. If such a scenario arises,
national politics shall henceforth be not one of petty squabbling between
bourgeoisie parties of differing shades, but it shall be an ideology based
political battle between the group of progressive forces and the ‘sangh’ of reactionary
forces.
REFERENCES
[1] Palshikar, Suhas: “The Defeat of the
Congress”, Economic & Political
Weekly, Sept. 2014, vol. XLIX, No. 39, pp 57-63.
[2] Chhibber, Pradeep & Verma, Rahul:
“The BJP’s 2014 ‘Modi Wave’ – An Ideological Consolidation of the Right”, Economic & Political Weekly, Sept.
2014, vol. XLIX, No. 39, pp 50-56.
[3] Sridharan, E.: “Class Voting in the
2014 Lok Sabha Elections – The Growing Size and Importance of the Middle
Classes”, Economic & Political Weekly,
Sept. 2014, vol. XLIX, No. 39, pp 72-76.
[4] Palshikar, Suhas & Suri, K.C.:
“India’s 2014 Lok Sabha Elections – Critical Shifts in the Long Term, Caution
in the Short Term”, Economic &
Political Weekly, Sept. 2014, vol. XLIX, No. 39, pp 39-49.
[5] Kailash, K.K.: “Regional Parties in
the 16th Lok Sabha Elections – Who Survived and Why”, Economic & Political Weekly, Sept.
2014, vol. XLIX, No. 39, pp 64-71.
Iversen, Torben & Soskice, David: “Electoral Institutions and the
Politics of Coalitions – Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others”, American Political Science Review, May 2006,
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